This paper introduces the PettingZoo library and the accompanying Agent Environment Cycle ("AEC") games model. PettingZoo is a library of diverse sets of multi-agent environments with a universal, elegant Python API. PettingZoo was developed with the goal of accelerating research in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning ("MARL "), by making work more interchangeable, accessible and reproducible akin to what OpenAI's Gym library did for single-agent reinforcement

Abstract-- We study the robustness of an agent decision-making model in finite-population games, with a particular focus on the Kullback-Leibler Divergence Regularized Learning (KLD-RL) model. Specifically, we examine how the model's parameters influence the impact of various sources of noise and modeling inaccuracies--factors commonly encountered in engineering applications of population games--on agents' decision-making. Our analysis provides insights into how these parameters can be effectively tuned to mitigate such effects. Theoretical results are supported by numerical examples and simulation studies that validate the analysis and illustrate practical strategies for parameter selection. The population game and evolutionary dynamics framework provides a powerful foundation for modeling and analyzing repeated strategic interactions among a population of decision-making agents [1].

Designing institutions for social-ecological systems requires models that capture heterogeneity, uncertainty, and strategic interaction. Multiple modeling approaches have emerged to meet this challenge, including empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), which merges ABM's scale and diversity with game-theoretic models' formal equilibrium analysis. The newly popular class of LLM-driven simulations provides yet another approach, and it is not clear how these approaches can be integrated with one another, nor whether the resulting simulations produce a plausible range of behaviours for real-world social-ecological governance. To address this gap, we compare four LLM-augmented frameworks: procedural ABMs, generative ABMs, LLM-EGTA, and expert guided LLM-EGTA, and evaluate them on a real-world case study of irrigation and fishing in the Amu Darya basin under centralized and decentralized governance. Our results show: first, procedural ABMs, generative ABMs, and LLM-augmented EGTA models produce strikingly different patterns of collective behaviour, highlighting the value of methodological diversity. Second, inducing behaviour through system prompts in LLMs is less effective than shaping behaviour through parameterized payoffs in an expert-guided EGTA-based model.

Decision-making in automated driving must consider interactions with surrounding agents to be effective. However, traditional methods often neglect or oversimplify these interactions because they are difficult to model and solve, which can lead to overly conservative behavior of the ego vehicle. To address this gap, we propose two quantum game models, QG-U1 (Quantum Game - Unitary 1) and QG-G4 (Quantum Game - Gates 4), for interaction-aware decision-making. These models extend classical game theory by incorporating principles of quantum mechanics, such as superposition, interference, and entanglement. Specifically, QG-U1 and QG-G4 are designed for two-player games with two strategies per player and can be executed in real time on a standard computer without requiring quantum hardware. We evaluate both models in merging and roundabout scenarios and compare them with classical game-theoretic methods and baseline approaches (IDM, MOBIL, and a utility-based technique). Results show that QG-G4 achieves lower collision rates and higher success rates compared to baseline methods, while both quantum models yield higher expected payoffs than classical game approaches under certain parameter settings.

This paper introduces the PettingZoo library and the accompanying Agent Environment Cycle ("AEC") games model. PettingZoo is a library of diverse sets of multi-agent environments with a universal, elegant Python API. PettingZoo was developed with the goal of accelerating research in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning ("MARL "), by making work more interchangeable, accessible and reproducible akin to what OpenAI's Gym library did for single-agent reinforcement

Game theory establishes a fundamental framework for analyzing strategic interactions among rational decision-makers. The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has sparked extensive research exploring the intersection of these two fields. Specifically, game-theoretic methods are being applied to evaluate and enhance LLM capabilities, while LLMs themselves are reshaping classic game models. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the intersection of these fields, exploring a bidirectional relationship from three perspectives: (1) Establishing standardized game-based benchmarks for evaluating LLM behavior; (2) Leveraging game-theoretic methods to improve LLM performance through algorithmic innovations; (3) Characterizing the societal impacts of LLMs through game modeling. Among these three aspects, we also highlight how the equilibrium analysis for traditional game models is impacted by LLMs' advanced language understanding, which in turn extends the study of game theory. Finally, we identify key challenges and future research directions, assessing their feasibility based on the current state of the field. By bridging theoretical rigor with emerging AI capabilities, this survey aims to foster interdisciplinary collaboration and drive progress in this evolving research area.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly facilitated human life, and prompt engineering has improved the efficiency of these models. However, recent years have witnessed a rise in prompt engineering-empowered attacks, leading to issues such as privacy leaks, increased latency, and system resource wastage. Though safety fine-tuning based methods with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) are proposed to align the LLMs, existing security mechanisms fail to cope with fickle prompt attacks, highlighting the necessity of performing security detection on prompts. In this paper, we jointly consider prompt security, service latency, and system resource optimization in Edge-Cloud LLM (EC-LLM) systems under various prompt attacks. To enhance prompt security, a vector-database-enabled lightweight attack detector is proposed. We formalize the problem of joint prompt detection, latency, and resource optimization into a multi-stage dynamic Bayesian game model. The equilibrium strategy is determined by predicting the number of malicious tasks and updating beliefs at each stage through Bayesian updates. The proposed scheme is evaluated on a real implemented EC-LLM system, and the results demonstrate that our approach offers enhanced security, reduces the service latency for benign users, and decreases system resource consumption compared to state-of-the-art algorithms.

This paper introduces the PettingZoo library and the accompanying Agent Environment Cycle ("AEC") games model. PettingZoo is a library of diverse sets of multi-agent environments with a universal, elegant Python API. PettingZoo was developed with the goal of accelerating research in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning ("MARL"), by making work more interchangeable, accessible and reproducible akin to what OpenAI's Gym library did for single-agent reinforcement learning. PettingZoo's API, while inheriting many features of Gym, is unique amongst MARL APIs in that it's based around the novel AEC games model. We argue, in part through case studies on major problems in popular MARL environments, that the popular game models are poor conceptual models of the games commonly used with MARL, that they promote severe bugs that are hard to detect, and that the AEC games model addresses these problems.

We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional population game formulations, we consider a scenario where agents must estimate the payoffs through local measurements and communication with their neighbors. By employing task allocation games -- dynamic extensions of conventional population games -- we examine how errors in payoff estimation by individual agents affect the convergence of the strategy revision process. Our main contribution is an analysis of how estimation errors impact the convergence of the agents' strategy profile to equilibrium. Based on the analytical results, we propose a design for a time-varying strategy revision rate to guarantee convergence. Simulation studies illustrate how the proposed method for updating the revision rate facilitates convergence to equilibrium.